How the New World Disorder is an Unanchored World of Unhinged People
George Friedman, founder of Geopolitical Futures, sees method in the madness of current global upheaval. But his critics argue he may be underestimating both China's strength and the resilience of int
In an era of global uncertainty, the world finds itself at a critical juncture, particularly regarding Russia's war with Ukraine and the ongoing peace negotiations in Saudi Arabia. These developments raise crucial questions about the future of Europe, Russia, and the United States.
According to geopolitical analyst George Friedman, in an interview on Mauldin Economics, we're witnessing a pattern familiar to American history: presidents who emerge during times of crisis often break established norms when those norms become unsustainable. He draws parallels between the current administration and historical figures like Andrew Jackson and Franklin D. Roosevelt, who faced similar criticism for breaking conventions during pivotal moments in American history.
The Ukraine conflict, Friedman argues, has exposed Russia's military weaknesses. After three years of warfare, Russia's failure to overcome what he describes as "a third-rate country" has resulted in massive casualties, economic strain, and diminished global standing. This failure has significantly weakened Putin's political position, with unrest emerging in regions like Siberia.
The conflict, however, represents more than just a war between Russia and Ukraine. Friedman characterises it as a "ballet between Russia and America with Ukraine as the stage." He explains that the conflict's roots trace back to the Cold War's aftermath, with Russia viewing Ukraine as a critical buffer against Western influence, particularly following the Maidan Square uprising.
The choice of Saudi Arabia as the negotiation venue is particularly significant. This decision reflects a broader strategy to reshape global power dynamics, bringing Saudi Arabia into the realm of great powers alongside the major oil producers. The negotiations extend beyond the Ukraine conflict, encompassing broader Middle Eastern issues, including the Israeli-Arab relationship.
China's role in this shifting landscape is notably diminished. Friedman contends that China is weaker than commonly perceived, with economic struggles and military limitations constraining its global influence. This assessment challenges conventional views of China as an imminent superpower.
The emerging world order, as Friedman sees it, is "unanchored" - a departure from the Cold War era when nations aligned themselves clearly with either the U.S. or Russia. This new reality presents both challenges and opportunities for global stability and cooperation.
Britain's decision to return the Chagos Islands to Mauritius stems from international legal obligations, following rulings by the International Court of Justice and sustained UN pressure. This adherence to international law, despite the strategic significance of Diego Garcia's U.S. military base, demonstrates how traditional power dynamics are increasingly constrained by global legal frameworks. The decision exemplifies a shift where even major powers must balance their strategic interests against international legal obligations, adding another layer of complexity to the 'unanchored' world order Friedman describes.
The potential settlement for Ukraine might include permanent neutrality, though the complexity of proposed guarantor nations and security arrangements makes implementation challenging. The ultimate resolution may be simpler: Ukraine maintaining neutrality while receiving reconstruction aid, similar to post-World War II Germany and Japan.
This period of global restructuring, while appearing chaotic, follows historical patterns of how nations adapt to changing power dynamics. The current administration's approach, though controversial, reflects a recognition of these shifting realities and the need to establish new frameworks for international relations.
Critique: Friedman's Analysis
While Friedman offers compelling insights into current global dynamics, his analysis warrants scrutiny on several fronts. His characterisation of Russia's failure in Ukraine, while accurate in military terms, potentially oversimplifies Russia's strategic achievements. Despite military setbacks, Russia has succeeded in destabilising Ukraine's economy, deterring NATO expansion, and demonstrating the limits of Western unity.
Friedman's dismissal of China's power seems particularly premature. While China faces significant economic challenges, its influence extends beyond military capability through initiatives like the Belt and Road, technological advancement, and economic partnerships. The assessment of China as "weaker than commonly perceived" might reflect Western-centric thinking that overemphasises traditional military metrics while undervaluing other forms of power projection.
His interpretation of the Saudi Arabia negotiations venue as a masterstroke of American strategy may overstate U.S. agency. Saudi Arabia's emerging role might instead reflect the natural evolution of a multipolar world where regional powers increasingly assert their independence from traditional power blocs. The kingdom's recent rapprochement with Iran, conducted without U.S. involvement, suggests a more autonomous strategic position than Friedman acknowledges.
Furthermore, Friedman's parallel between current global restructuring and historical American presidential actions may overstate the role of individual leadership while understating systemic forces. The comparison with Roosevelt and Jackson, while historically interesting, risks reducing complex global transformations to personalities and decisions of individual leaders.
Most significantly, Friedman's concept of an "unanchored world" might paradoxically underestimate the emerging new anchors: international law, economic interdependence, and climate change imperatives. The recent case of Britain's Chagos Islands decision particularly challenges his thesis.
Britain's compliance with non-binding International Court of Justice rulings and UN pressure appears, at first glance, to demonstrate the growing influence of international legal frameworks over traditional power politics. However, this may prove to be an outlier rather than a trend. The surge in populist and nationalist movements worldwide suggests Friedman's "unanchored world" thesis might be more accurate than his critics acknowledge. These movements, often hostile to international institutions and multilateral commitments, are increasingly challenging the post-Cold War liberal order. While Britain may yield to international pressure on the Chagos Islands today, the rising tide of nationalism could well reverse such commitments tomorrow.
Perhaps Friedman's error lies not in underestimating international institutions, but in underestimating how thoroughly populist movements might dismantle them.
Indeed, Friedman's analysis appears increasingly prescient when examining the fundamental failure of what liberals term the 'rules-based global order'. This order, built on diplomatic niceties and international institutions, represents an idealistic dream divorced from geopolitical reality. The Chagos Islands case exemplifies this disconnect: whilst Britain's compliance with international rulings might appear as a triumph of global governance, it actually demonstrates the self-inflicted irrelevance of Western liberal democracies.
The fatal flaw in this approach lies in how liberal governments consistently prioritise adherence to international frameworks over their primary contract with their own electorates. More damagingly, this diplomatic obsession has led to the systematic undermining of the only true currency in international relations: military might. NATO members' chronic underfunding of their defence commitments serves as a stark example of this self-destructive tendency.
What emerges is a form of international Darwinism. Former President Trump's approach, often criticised for its bluntness, simply acknowledges this reality: diplomatic niceties become pointless when faced with determined adversaries. The current global crisis reveals how liberal democracies' focus on rational diplomacy has not only failed to prevent aggression but has actually encouraged it by projecting weakness. Their irrelevance in addressing today's challenges stands as testament to this fundamental miscalculation.
This perspective suggests Friedman's 'unanchored world' thesis might be more accurately described as a return to fundamental truths about power and international relations—truths that the post-Cold War liberal order attempted, unsuccessfully, to transcend.